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In the face of the impossible. 
Existential sources 
of post-secular thought 
A B S T RAC T
In this article, the problem of “the experience of the impossible”, 
which seems to embody the “religious stage of existence” most fully is 
tackled, i.e., within the relation of the individual to God (Absolute). 
The category of “the impossible”, undoubtedly one of the funda­
mental categories of modern post-secular thought (Caputo, Lévinas, 
Marion), is outlined here in the perspective of existential philoso­
phy, and more specifically – its existential (especially Kierkegaard­
ian) sources. The aim is, therefore, to attempt to show something 
that is unimaginable because it exceeds “the order of reason”, the 
cognitive capacity of the human intellect on the one hand, while on 
the other hand it is at least seemingly inexpressible, because it es­
capes the objective, scientific handling. Therefore it is argued that 
the experience of the impossible, including his affirmation, is pri­
marily a problem of existential-religious nature, requiring a “leap” 
beyond what is seen as rational, socially valid, and even ethical from 
the human perspective.
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S T R E S Z C Z E N I E
Wobec niemożliwego. Egzystencjalne źródła myśli postsekularnej
W niniejszym artykule podjęty zostanie problem „doświadczenia nie­
możliwego”, które najpełniej zdaje się urzeczywistniać w „religijnym 
stadium egzystencji”, to jest w relacji jednostki do Boga (Absolutu). 
Kategoria „niemożliwego”, niewątpliwie jedna z  fundamentalnych 
kategorii współczesnej myśli postsekularnej (Caputo, Lévinas, Ma­
rion), zarysowana tu zostanie w  perspektywie filozofii egzystencjal­
nej, a  dokładniej  – jej egzystencjalnych (zwłaszcza Kierkegaardow­
skich) źródeł. Celem naszym będzie więc próba ukazania tego, co 
z  jednej strony niewyobrażalne, bo przekraczające „porządek rozu­
mu”, poznawcze zdolności ludzkiego intelektu, z drugiej zaś – przy­
najmniej pozornie niewyrażalne, bo wymykające się przedmiotowe­
mu, naukowemu ujęciu. Będziemy tym samym argumentować na 
rzecz tezy, iż doświadczenie niemożliwego, w tym jego afirmacja, jest 
przede wszystkim problemem egzystencjalno-religijnym, wymagają­
cym „skoku” poza to, co z ludzkiej perspektywy jawi się jako racjonal­
ne, społecznie obowiązujące, a nawet etyczne.
S Ł O WA  K LU C Z O W E :    człowiek, niemożliwe, rozum, wiara, 
absurd, paradoks, doświadczenie religijne, 
egzystencjalizm, postsekularyzm.
In this article, the problem of the “experience of the impossible”, which 
seems to embody the “religious stage of existence” is tackled within the re­
lation of the individual to God (Absolute). The category of “the impossi­
ble”, undoubtedly one of the fundamental categories of modern post-secu­
lar thought (Caputo, Lévinas, Marion), is outlined here in the perspective 
of existential philosophy, and more specifically – its existential (especially 
Kierkegaardian) sources. Our aim shall, therefore, be to attempt to show 
something that is unimaginable because it exceeds “the order of reason”, 
the cognitive capacity of the human intellect on the one hand, while on 
the other hand, it is at least seemingly inexpressible, because it escapes the 
objective, scientific handling. We will therefore argue that the experience 
of the impossible, including its affirmation, is primarily a problem of exi-
stential-religious nature, requiring a “leap of faith” beyond what is seen as 
rational, socially valid, and even ethical from the human perspective.
 In the first part I  shall shortly present the specifics of post-secular 
thought, pointing to its existential sources. In the second, referring to 
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diagnoses of Søren Kierkegaard, I will stress the significance of the philo­
sophical experience of human subjectivity. In the third part we will look at 
the relationship between “problematic” religious existence (the religious 
stage of existence), interpreting the attitude of the biblical Abraham in 
the context of the “passion of the impossible”. The considerations shall be 
closed with a presentation of the significance of Kierkegaard’s existential 
philosophy for contemporary post-secular thought, especially the radical 
hermeneutics of John D. Caputo.
Post-secular thought and existentialism. 
Introductory remarks 
One must notice that post-secular thought, ever more boldly explored by 
contemporary humanists of all walks of intellectual life, is essentially het­
erogeneous, eluding all attempts at unambiguous conceptualization. It 
is most commonly characterized as the return to the religious sphere, as 
its horizon is marked by such terms as “the return of the sacred” (Daniel 
Bell), “desecularization of the world” (Peter Berger), “the revenge of God” 
(Gilles Kepel) and the “return of the gods” (Friedrich Wilhelm Graf). The 
term “post-secularism”, keeping in mind its ambiguity and semantic ca­
pacity, can be regarded as “one of the wandering concepts of the humani-
ties, which, though without a  common theoretical denominator, indi­
cates a tendency to re-take the subject of religion in a number of research 
areas, from sociology, to theory of politics, literature, cultural studies, to 
philosophy.” 1 Given the various spaces of post-secular reflection, the mul­
tiplicity of perspectives and contexts, it is not only difficult to clearly de­
fine it, but also to appoint its representatives. Post-secular thought is often 
associated with authors whose works significantly differ in terms of both 
methodological and ideological (world-view) terms. It shall suffice, for ex­
ample, to name such authors as Charles Taylor, Michel de Certeau, Slavoj 
1 M.  Matlak, D.  Wolska, Postsekularyzm jako wędrujące pojęcie. Wprowadzenie, „Prace Kultu­
roznawcze”, 1(21)/2017, p. 11. For more on this topic cf. M. Warchala, Co to jest postsekula-
ryzm? (Subiektywna) próba opisu, „Krytyka Polityczna”, 13/2007, p. 178-190; Idem, Postsekular-
ne konstelacje nowoczesności. O historycznych związkach religii i nauk społecznych, „Stan Rzeczy”, 
2(5)/2013, p. 75-92; P. Burdziej, Socjologia postsekularna?, „Studia Socjologiczne”, 2(197)/2010, 
p. 89-107; P. Bogalecki, A. Mitek-Dziemba, Drzewo Poznania. Wprowadzenie do myśli postseku-
larnej, [in:] Drzewo Poznania. Postsekularyzm w przekładach i komentarzach, ed. P. Bogalecki, 
A. Mitek-Dziemba, Katowice 2012, p. 25-51; E. Drzewiecka, Myśl postsekularna w badaniach 
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Žižek, Roberto Unger, Alain Badiou, Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Jür­
gen Habermas or Jacques Derrida, to see how different intellectual orien­
tations (including political and religious) they represent. In fact, there are 
atheists among them, along with proponents of Marxism and nihilism, but 
also theists, non-confessional defenders of religion and the Judeo-Chris­
tian heritage. 2 
 Post-secular thinkers agree, however, on one matter: they have a criti­
cal attitude towards the specific modern secularism that  – through the 
Weberian postulate of “disenchantment of the world”, made human rea­
son the philosophical “principle” of cognition and understanding of re­
ality and the world phenomena, shunning all that is irrational, unscien­
tific, and existential/religious. 3 We can add: shunning all that appears as 
apore tic, absurd and paradoxical from the point of view of “pure reason” 
(Kant), in one word: impossible. Post-secularism, sharing the post-mo-
dern criticism of modernity (and contesting the intellectual vision of the 
world, the superiority of knowledge over faith, the primacy of the lay over 
the religious), indicates at the same time a crisis of the enlightenment rea­
son and all the “master narratives” (Lyotard) built upon it, thus the idea-
listic, specu lative philosophical systems. It would therefore seem that we 
are dealing with the rehabilitation of the “order of the heart” (to refer to 
Pascal’s famous term), recognition of faith as “equal” a source of cogni­
tion in relation to the human intellect. 4 But tellingly, post-secular thought 
does not involve any “naïve” return to religion (pre-modern religiosity 
that refers to the figure of God-Creator, merciful God-Father, and a sense-
providing Providence), rather, it signifies complexity, searching for new 
alternative forms of spirituality, more private, non-confessional, and non-
- institutional – adopted to the challenges of the modern world. Addition­
ally, it searches for forms, to quote the words of Jürgen Habermas that 
“cooperate with the enlightenment”. 5 Post-secularism, which is worth em­
phasizing, not only raises the problem of the socio-cultural importance of 
religion, but also tracks down the more or less hidden (implicit) themes 
2 Cf. G. McLennan, The Postsecular Turn, “Theory, Culture, Society”, 4(27)/2010, p. 3-20.
3 Charles Taylor rightly stresses that secularization does not mean a complete disappearance of 
religion, but rather, developing new conditions of its functioning. Reflecting upon the political 
secularism, Taylor also speaks, which is especially interesting in the context of these considera­
tions, about secularism as the disintegration of the institutional forms of religion, and thus the 
weakening of the Orthodox form of faith. Cf. Ch. Taylor, A Secular Age, Cambridge 2007.
4 Cf. M. Błaszczyk, O problemie relacji między filozofią a teologią. Preliminaria, „Idea”, XXIX/1, 
2017, p. 77-96.
5 J. Habermas, Wierzyć i wiedzieć, [in:] Przyszłość natury ludzkiej, Warszawa 2003, p. 103-115; 
Idem, Między naturalizmem a religią, Warszawa 2012. Cf. also T. Adorno, Rozum i objawienie, 
„Kronos”, 1/2007, p. 28-33.
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and the religious assumptions (“crypto theologies”), which seem to lie at 
the heart of any, even the most secular (secularized) philosophy. 6 In this 
sense, it allows one to go beyond the dichotomy between “religion” and 
“secularism” permanently rooted in the tradition of European philosophy, 
making individual religious experience an important subject of academic 
discourse. 7
 The roots of post-secularism are most often believed to be found in the 
romantic and modernist thought, and in the views of the so-called critical 
theory (Frankfurt School): Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, on top 
of Walter Benjamin (Habermas cited above seems to be their heir). These 
positions are widely known and commonly shared, which is reflected in 
numerous publications undertaking this topic. 8 Not denying their equity, 
let us try to set a “new” interpretative path 9 by “suspending” the past con­
ceptualizations of the post-secular thought and look at it “from the out­
side”, searching for its sources in existential philosophy, especially Kier-
kegaard’s. This trick seems to be interesting for at least several reasons. 
 First of all, existentialism, just as post-secular reflection, is not so 
much a  non-uniform current in philosophy (or philosophy and litera­
ture), as a  multi-faceted cultural phenomenon, which is outside phi­
losophy, encompassing theology, religious studies, psychology, and art. 10 
6 Cf. A. Bielik-Robson, Na pustyni. Kryptoteologie późnej nowoczesności, Kraków 2008, p. 7-9.
7 On the potential post-secular perspective in the study of literature and culture, cf. K. Jarzyńska, 
Postsekularyzm – wyzwanie dla teorii i historii literatury (rozpoznania wstępne), „Teksty Drugie”, 
1-2/2012, p. 294-307; E. Drzewiecka, Spotkania pod Krzyżem. O myśli postsekularnej w bada-
niach nad literaturą nowoczesną, „Kultura – Media – Teologia”, 26/2016, p. 52-74; A. Bielik­
-Robson, Literackie kryptoteologie nowoczesności, czyli o  pierwszeństwie świata, „Wielogłos”, 
2(24)/2015, p. 13-28; A. Kołos, Postsekularyzm a literatura. Przykład Edwarda Stachury, „Ogrody 
Nauk i Sztuk”, 1/2011, p. 284-292. 
8 Cf. e.g. M. Warchala, Romantyzm i narodziny myśli postsekularnej, „Logos i Ethos”, 1(36)/2014, 
p.  73-85; A.  Bielik-Robson, Powrót mesjańskiej obietnicy, czyli postsekularyzm w  sensie ści-
słym, [in:] Deus otiosus. Nowoczesność w  perspektywie postsekularnej, ed. A.  Bielik-Robson, 
M.A. Sosnow ski, Warszawa 2013, p. 337-350.
9 That proposal for interpretation, it seems, is not so much new as newly raised. As Ryszard Nycz 
argues, citing the words of Henryk Markiewicz, “the new is usually the long-forgotten old.” 
R. Nycz, Nowa humanistyka w Polsce. Kilka bardzo subiektywnych obserwacji, koniektur, refutacji, 
„Teksty Drugie”, 1/2017, p. 22. Recalling the existential source of post-secular thought, I wish 
to also draw attention to the importance and unprecedented timeliness of existentialism, thus 
contesting the idea that it is a long outdated current in contemporary philosophy.
10 Cf. e.g. K. Toeplitz, Egzystencjalizm jako zjawisko kulturowe, Gdańsk 1983; W. Barnes, The Phi-
losophy and Literature of Existentialism, New York 1968; T.R. Flynn, Existentialism. A Very Short 
Introduction, Oxford 2006; K. Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, Berlin 1919; H. Spie­
gelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, Evanston 1972; A.L. van Kaam, Existen-
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“ Existentia lism”, Karol Toeplitz says, “is not a philosophy in the traditio-
nal sense of the word, but an inconsistent reflection on matters of a unique 
human being”. 11 Rollo May, in turn, notes that existentialism is an expres­
sion of the depth of today’s emotional and spiritual problems, which re­
veal themselves in almost all aspects of culture. 12 Secondly, this heteroge­
neity of existentialism results in the fact that (as is the case of post-secular 
thought) to this day a wide variety of its interpretations and ways of clas­
sifying philosophers associated with it has accumulated. Sometimes both 
religious (theistic) thinkers and atheistic thinkers of “neutral” ideological 
standing are associated with existentialism, as well as “seekers” of their 
own, individual path of spiritual development. 13 Thirdly, a common de­
nominator of post-secularism and existential philosophy (Kierkegaardian) 
seems to be a critique of enlightenment reason (panlogism), an aversion 
to construct abstract, speculative systems of thought (“master narratives”) 
and – consequently – a return to religiosity. It should be noted that exis­
tentialism was originally a religious current (St. Augustine, Pascal), and 
not an  atheist one, as it is mostly defined for the sake of the philosophical 
works of Jean-Paul Sartre, a leading representative of this current: “histori-
cally,  existentialism has Christian provenance; one would even say: it is 
one of the most typical attitudes for Christian feeling and understanding 
of life”. 14 Kierkegaard, as we shall see, speaks about the private (non-con­
fessional) religiousness of the individual through denying the official, in­
stitutionalized Christianity. As he emphasizes, only in personal, intimate 
contact with God can one realize the truth of human existence (as subjec­
tivity). Faith, which the philosopher recommends, however, is of a special 
kind, because it does not bring a desired state of human happiness and 
relief, but rather increases the sense of insecurity, fear and despair. It is 
worth noting that such post-secular thinkers as Jean-Luc Marion and John 
D.  Caputo make referrences to the diagnoses of Kierkegaard. Fourthly, 
both post-secular thought and existential philosophy show the specificity 
of human existence (being-in-the-world), problematizing the individual 
existential experience (including religious experience). Placing man at the 
11 K. Toeplitz, op. cit., p. 6.
12 R. May, O istocie człowieka. Szkice z psychologii egzystencjalnej, Poznań 1995, p. 56.
13 On the possible method for classification of philosophers of existence, cf. P. Wójs, Filozofowie 
egzystencji, [in:] Oblicza egzystencjalizmu, ed. M. Błaszczyk, Kraków 2017, p. 17-30.
14 T. Terlecki, Egzystencjalizm chrześcijański, [in:] Krytyka personalistyczna. Egzystencjalizm chrześ-
cijański, Warszawa 1987, p. 47. Cf. P. Roubiczek, Existentialism. For and Against, Cambridge 
1964, p. 9-10; W. Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, New York 1975, p. 49-50; 
W. Barrett, Irrational Man. A Study in Existential Philosophy, New York 1958, p. 17; F. Heine­
mann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament, London 1953, p. 2-3; M.A. Fox, The Remar-
kable Existentialists, New York 2009, p. 14-15.
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center of their interests, they seem to be looking for new forms of rational­
ity (phronesis), which would lay out the meaning of that experience. This 
motif, only signaled here, is also characteristic of the contemporary herme­
neutic reflection. 15 
 Signaling the similarity between post-secularism and existential­
ism, I want not so much to pay attention to the fact that the post-secular 
thought appears as a creative continuation of ideas born from the bosom 
of existentialism. I would rather look at the specific issues of the impos­
sible (and more specifically, the affirmation of religious experience of the 
impossible); which – in my opinion – has its main source is in the existen­
tial reflection of Kierkegaard.
Towards human subjectivity
Søren Kierkegaard was undoubtedly one of the first thinkers who revealed 
the importance of subjective existential experience. The nineteenth-cen­
tury theologian and philosopher is in fact against all intellectual systems, 
trying to capture human existence as a general formula. Stubbornly and 
persistently seeking the truth of individual existence, the sense of indi­
vidual existence, he directs his criticism mainly against the speculative, 
idea listic philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, which he considers to be a “classic” 
mani festation of the “systematization of systems”. As Emmanuel Mounier 
notes: “Kierkegaard stood against the Hegel’s absolute system, a systemati­
zation of the system, which opposes the absolute Existence.” 16 Kierkegaard 
criticizes the systemic philosophy (and also “scientific” reflection based 
on possibly the most general assumptions and concepts) especially due 
to the fact that it mostly marginalizes and even “loses” the fundamental 
philosophical question, which is the individual human being, individual 
15 More on the topic of hermeneutic rationality (phronesis), cf. M. Januszkiewicz, W poszukiwa-
niu sensu. Phronesis i hermeneutyka, Poznań 2016, p. 9-32; Idem, Phronesis: racjonalność herme-
neutyczna, „Przestrzenie Teorii”, 25/2016, p. 81-94.
16 E. Mounier, Wprowadzenie do egzystencjalizmów, Kraków 1964, p. 221. Interestingly, some re­
searchers of Kierkegaard’s thought claim that he knew Hegel’s philosophy mainly from secon­
dary sources. The Dane’s “fight” with Heglism was therefore not an exposure of a qualitati­
ve difference which in his opinion exists between speculative philosophy and Christianity. Cf. 
N. Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, Princeton, New Jersey 1980, p. 75-91; J. Collins, 
The Mind of Kierkegaard, New Jersey 1983, p.  105; G.  Malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought, 
Princeton 1971, p. 58-59. On Kierkegaard’s critcism of heglism cf. also J. Stewart, Kierkegaard’s 
Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge 2003, p.  448-523; T.  Kupś, Koncepcja egzystencji 
Sørena Kierkegaarda w kontekście filozofii niemieckiej, Toruń 2004, p. 128-142; A. Szwed, Ro-
zum wobec chrześcijańskiego Objawienia, Kęty 2011, p. 442-545.
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human existence. For, in fact, according to the author of The Sickness Unto 
Death, it is not subjected to conceptualization and it cannot be closed 
within diligently abstracted intellectual concepts, but it always eludes all 
categorical frameworks.
 The Danish philosopher, as one of the first anti-essentialist thinkers 
showing the philosophical importance of what eludes systemization and 
science, i.e., the subjective experience of being-in-the world, seeks to “the 
thing is to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can 
live and die.” 17 Already a brief reflection on the above statement allows us 
to note that the primary purpose of Kierkegaard’s philosophizing was the 
search for meaning of individual existence and the truth about the hu­
man condition. It is not surprising, therefore, that Søren Kierkegaard (also 
called the Socrates of the North) is widely recognized as the father of exis­
tential philosophy. 18
 Kierkegaard, whose thought and personality was, to a  large extent, 
shaped by the atmosphere of his family home (the influence of his father, 
strict religious upbringing, obsession with sin and death 19), was particu­
larly interested in man’s relation to the Absolute, namely: the relationship 
 between the mortal individual, marked by ontological insufficiency and the 
infinite God, transcendental relative thereto, ungraspable by human rea­
son. The author of the Practice in Christianity, according to which man is 
the synthesis of time and eternity, freedom and necessity, and more broad­
ly in the further part of this discussion, I do not want to accept any form 
of mediating elements of that synthesis. Kierkegaard, wanting to place 
man in an “absolute relationship with the Absolute”, therefore, looking 
17 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, Dziennik (wybór), Lublin 2000, p. 41. Cf. also Jaspers, Aneignung und Pole-
mik, München 1968, p. 301. Kierkegaard seems to say here that the truth of a single existence, 
far beyond the framework of the totalizing system, happens only in subjective cognition. Cf. 
D.J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge 1996, p. 105-106; M. Gabriel, Sub-
jectivity and Religious Truth in the Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, Macon, Georgia 2010, d. 90-
129; J. Caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, New York 2008, p. 56-66. Cf. also M. Domaradzki, 
O subiektywności prawdy w ujęciu Sørena Aabye Kierkegaarda, Poznań 2006. 
18 Existentialism researchers even unanimously recognize Kierkegaard as the precursor of 20th 
century philosophy of existence. See. e.g. R. Harper, Existentialism. A Theory of Man, Camb­
ridge 1949, p. 44; H.J. Blackham, Six existentialist thinkers, London 1956, p. 1-2; M. Warnock, 
Egzystencjalizm, Warszawa 2006, p. 15; J. Wahl, Krótka historia egzystencjalizmu, Wrocław 2004, 
p. 17. See. also P. Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard. The Father of Existentialism, Copenhagen 1983. 
19 For more on this topic, cf. J. Kossak, Egzystencjalizm w filozofii i literaturze, Warszawa 1976, 
p.  68; A.  Rogalski, Tryptyk miłosny, Warszawa 1977, p.  22-80; P.  Rohde, Søren Kierkegaard, 
Wrocław 2001, p. 52-82. Lev Shestov even says (in accordance with the spirit of Kierkegaard’s 
writings), that biographical stories (especially the influence of his father and the unhappy love 
to Regina Olsen) pervade in almost all works of Kierkegaard. Cf. L. Szestow, Ateny i Jerozolima, 
Kraków 1993, p. 273; Idem, Kierkegaard i filozofia egzystencjalna, Warszawa 2009, p. 72, 87-90.
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for individual authenticity, probably the most fully identifiable with a trag­
ic sense of the absolute paradox – the paradox of faith. As Antoni Szwed 
accurately concludes: “the paradox of the absolute is not a  simple logi­
cal contradiction, violating the law of non-contradiction, but is something 
that reveals the secret area, beyond the reach of reason. The paradox sets 
the boundaries of reason and the need to use negative terms. It is, there­
fore, an act of opening for the divine transcendence. This in turn is sensed 
in the experience of amazement with the presence of something, which ra­
tional reflection is not able to comprehend. The absolute amazement leads 
to that what is divine, what reason is not able to figure out, but rather clos­
es itself to, rejecting amazement and faith emerging with it”. 20 As we shall 
see below, Kierkegaard’s man, contesting “the order of reason”, will turn to 
the non-definable experience of faith, affirming something which, at least 
from a human perspective, is absurd and impossible.
In the face of the impossible. The experience of faith
Kierkegaard, as we know, distinguishes three stages of human existence 
(aesthetic, ethical and religious), which seem to constitute man’s relation­
ship with the world (the possible) and God (the impossible) problematic. 
Let us add, citing the philosopher, that the transition between these stages 
is radical – it is a “leap” someone has make into a different form of exi-
stence. 21 At this point, due to the limited space, I shall briefly characteri ze 
“religious existence”, which – as Kierkegaard notes, shows through a per­
sonal relationship with God as the true vocation of man: “Transition to 
the religious stage of life is the inevitable fate of every human being, if 
they do not want to turn a blind eye to their actual position in the world.” 22 
Only here – through the internalization of what is irrational – Sense can 
be found in the absolute terms. The price man has to pay, however, for the 
unveiling of the “madness of reason” and thus complete abandonment of 
20 A.  Szwed, op. cit., p.  525. Cf. T.  Płużański, Paradoks w  nowożytnej filozofii chrześcijańskiej, 
Warszawa 1970, p.  85-102; N.H.  Soe, Kierkegaard’s Doctrine of the Paradox, [in:] A  Kierke-
gaard Critique. An International Selection of Essays Interpreting Kierkegaard, red. H.A. John­
son, N. Thulstrup, Chicago 1967, p. 207-227; H. Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence, 
Edinburgh-London 1959, p. 60; C.S. Evans, Kierkegaard. An Introduction, Cambridge 2009, 
p. 139-166.
21 For more on this topic, cf. S.N. Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness. A Structural 
Analysis of the Theory of Stages, Princeton 1985, p. 32-140; K. Toeplitz, Kierkegaard, Warszawa 
1980, p. 47-89; M. Gabriel, op. cit., p. 14-59.
22 A. Miś, Filozofia współczesna. Główne nurty, Warszawa 2000, p. 97-98.
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“thinking according to ethics” in favor of the specific experience of faith, 
which is oriented towards the inconceivable and infinite as a source of exi-
stential anxiety. In other words, ethics is of a general nature, while religion 
of individual, personal and existential. Ethics, based on “clear” criteria, 
seems to be “predictable”; referring to the finitude of human being-in-
-the-world, it leaves no room for the paradoxical and aporetic. Religion, 
in turn, on the contrary, confronts the individual temporal existence with 
the infinite, almighty God, revealing a perspective of eternity. Placing man 
in the face of the Most High, for whom “nothing is impossible”, demands 
taking the “leap of faith” beyond the obvious and rational. Thus he calls 
for challenging and ethical order and approval of the absurd (impossible) 
as the Absolute. 23
 Kierkegaard, which is worth noting, distinguishes two types of religio-
sity – religiousness A and religiousness B. The first of them – he says – is 
the most common form of the faith, characteristic of most human beings. 
It does not require breaking with the natural order of creation – the hu­
man being, wanting to “justify” their existence, is directed by divine com­
mandments and precepts (responsibilities). Religiousness “A” gives the in­
dividual a sense of certain “existential comfort”, a sense of certainty about 
the existence of God, His intimacy and love, while recognizing its own 
smallness, mortality and sinfulness. Religiousness “B” on the other hand, 
says Kierkegaard, requires a total abandon of reason, any objective, wide­
ly respected truths and values; it is a “leap” out of the mundane (earthly) 
world, beyond what the individual knows well and finds predictable; it is 
a “leap” beyond all human and limited. For where the human mind en­
counters aporias, where it encounters absurd, faith sees an opportunity 
there, because for God “nothing is impossible”.
 However, most importantly, religiousness “B” also generates a fear of 
emptiness, hidden behind any metaphysical quest. Basically, it is the fear 
of “the possibility of impossibility”, which – from a human point of view – 
seems to be always the ineffable mystery. That kind of religiousness is 
therefore paradoxical, since it makes us realize the gap, the infinite gulf 
between God and man, between what is absolute and what is individual in 
relation to the Absolute, between the Sense and the infernal desire thereof. 
Kierkegaard wants at the same time to say that it is impossible to know or 
understand the intentions of the Supreme, Who thinks according to oth­
er categories than human ones. Finally, the object of faith here is what is 
23 Cf. J.A. Prokopski, Søren Kierkegaard. Dialektyka paradoksu wiary, Wrocław 2002, p. 111-127; 
M.J. Ferreira, Faith and the Kierkegaardian leap, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, 
ed. A. Hannay, G. Marino, Cambridge 1998, p. 207-234.
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essentially distant and totally absurd. 24 Let us add that religiousness “B”, 
according to Kierkegaard, has a specifically Christian provenance. We can 
even venture to claim that the author The Sickness Unto Death contesting 
all the institutionalized forms of the “Christian world”, was first of all in­
terested in how to be a “true Christian”. 25
 Faith which Søren Kierkegaard speaks about is undoubtedly a major 
challenge for the human being. This is because it does not bring relief, but 
increases the fear and despair. 26 The sense which it offers seems to be ab­
surd from the human perspective, and the possibility becomes impossibil­
ity. As “a human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the 
temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity,” 27 elements of absurd­
ity and paradox appear as inseparable elements of that faith: “This we be­
lieve by virtue of the absurd.” 28
 For Kierkegaard, the figure of Abraham, analyzed in Fear and Trem-
bling is a  specific symbol for the religious man. Abraham, by crossing 
the aesthetic and ethical stages became “but Abraham was greater than 
all, great by reason of his power whose strength is impotence, great by 
 reason of his wisdom whose secret is foolishness, great by reason of his 
hope whose form is madness, great by reason of the love which is hatred 
of oneself.” 29 That “knight of faith” is, for the Danish philosopher, a per­
son who is not only aware of the dramatic nature of his existential situa­
tion, but also –  despite anxiety consuming him –  can persevere to the end, 
which later will be rewarded. Indeed, Kierkegaard argues that the story of 
Abraham includes a “teleological suspension of ethics” (challenging the 
moral socio-cultural order) in favor of faith and, as such, places the indi­
vidual at the epiphany of impossibility, in the face of the extra-rational, ab­
solute sense. So here is the paradox: either Abraham, rising with the power 
of the absurd above the general is a murderer (son slayer), which deserves 
24 Cf. J.A. Prokopski, Egzystencja i tragizm. Dialektyka ludzkiej skończoności, Kęty 2007, p. 45-56; 
R. Thomte, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, New York 1969, p. 56.
25 Cf. p. Kierkegaard, Wprawki do chrześcijaństwa, Kęty 2002, p. 38; Idem, Dziennik, p. 386-387. 
More about Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity (and the essence of being a Christian), 
cf. A. Słowikowski, Wiara w egzystencji. Teoretyczny wymiar chrześcijańskiego ideału w pismach 
pseudonimowych Sørena Kierkegaarda, Warszawa-Toruń 2015.
26 More information on the Kierkegaard’s category of despair, cf. A. Hannay, Kierkegaard and the 
variety of despair, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, op. cit., p. 329-348; W. Kaftań­
ski, Rozpacz jako życie w śmierci w myśli Sørena Kierkegaarda, [in:] Wobec śmierci, ed. A. Grze­
gorczyk, A. Kaczmarek, Poznań 2012, p. 81-94; P. Lubańska, Pascal i Kierkegaard –  filozofowie 
rozpaczy i wiary, Kraków 2001, p. 51-79.
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condemnation; or, by answering the call of God, he is a believer (“knight 
of faith”), and then ethics shall be suspended and the rights of reason tran­
scended. As Tadeusz Płużański comments: “the life of Abraham is in the 
highest degree paradoxical, so that it is not quite thinkable at all. It is about 
the value of the absolute, which is measured at the same time the value of 
the absurd. For the absurd just a need to be able to realize the superiority 
of the individual over generality. Abraham gets Isaac back by virtue of the 
absurd. This paradox defies mediation.” 30
 Kierkegaard’s faith, as we can see, is associated with uncertainty and 
risk: “there is no faith without risk. Faith is precisely the contradiction be­
tween the infinite passion of the interior and the objective uncertainty. If 
I can objectively recognize God, then I don’t need to believe, but because 
I just can’t do this, I have to believe; Desiring to keep the faith, I have to 
constantly look to keep an objective uncertainty, to reach the very bottom 
of this uncertainty, and despite all this – to believe”. 31 The uncertainty of 
success – in the words of Pascal – is no lesser than the certainty of what 
the individual risks. That existential dilemma is particularly reinforced by 
the fact that the subject of faith, as we have said, seems to be radically dis­
tant, incomprehensible, and absurd in relation to man. The God an in­
dividual is looking for and to Whom it aspires, turns out to be a hidden 
God (Deus absconditus), silent and inaccessible, which enhances the in­
dividual’s existential uprooting, its ontological loneliness. 32 Kierkegaard, 
like Pascal once, does not want to settle for affirmation of human finitude, 
rather, he wants to show the human being in the face of what from the 
perspective of human reason appears to be absurd. The author of Disease 
unto death repeatedly emphasizes that faith – being the paradox of human 
existence – is the biggest passion of man (“man is the supreme passion of 
faith” 33), which directly relates to what is absolute and eternal. As Andrzej 
30 T. Płużański, Człowiek między ziemią a niebem, Warszawa 1977, p. 118. It is worth noting that 
the “absurd” (like “paradox”) is not a synonym for Kierkegaard’s “nonsense”, but is a mystery 
that falls outside human reason and therefore something which – as the inexpressible – rema­
ins outside its boundaries. More on Kierkegaard’s understanding of “absurd” and “paradox”, 
cf. C. Fabro, Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic, [in:] A Kierkegaard Critique, op. cit., 
p. 185-186.
31 As cited in E. Kasperski, Kierkegaard. Antropologia i dyskurs o człowieku, Pułtusk 2003, p. 444.
32 Karl Jaspers, interpreting Kierkegaardian man’s existential human turn to the religious, marks 
bluntly that “being the exception entails ... terrible loneliness.” K. Jaspers, Rozum i egzystencja, 
[in:] Rozum i egzystencja. Nietzsche a chrześcijaństwo, Warszawa 1991, p. 31-32. About loneliness 
of the Kierkegaardian man, cf. T. Kupś, O samotności chrześcijanina (Egzystencja religijna w uję-
ciu p. Kierkegaarda), [in:] Zrozumieć samotność. Studium interdyscyplinarne, ed. P. Domeracki, 
W. Tyburski, Toruń 2006, p. 147-162; R. Harper, The Seventh Solitude. Metaphysical Homeless-
ness in Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche, Baltimore 1967, p. 19-35.
33 S. Kierkegaard, Bojaźń i drżenie. Choroba na śmierć, p. 135.
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Słowikowski establishes: “This belief has one reference – God, in relation 
to Whom man acquires the right view of his life, finds the truth and self-
fulfillment. This reference, however, requires great sacrifices and austeri­
ties, as it requires from the human being to deny temporality, which is all 
the existing content of human life, in favor of eternity. It tells him to ne­
gate himself in order to be able to gain himself, in his real existential turn 
towards God”. 34 
 Kierkegaard, therefore, wishes at all costs to situate man, as he writes, 
“in absolute relation to the Absolute”, which – from the point of view of ra­
tional truths that constitute ethical standards is undoubtedly absurd. Abra­
ham found himself in this situation. In order to follow the order of God, 
he was forced at the same time to violate applicable ethical principles, and 
therefore go beyond the temporal and as such, the general. The thinker 
of Copenhagen clearly accentuates the fact that only one who implicitly 
trusts in God and is not afraid to entrust themselves to Him – even if His 
commands seem to be “immoral” – can be regarded as a paragon of Chris­
tianity: “The paradox of faith is therefore the hope that nothingness shall 
not triumph. ... faith is absurd, but in the face of it you should not run 
away, but come back to it”. 35 Only perseverance in the absurd (in faith) can 
make the impossible come true. In the case of Abraham it is the recovery 
of Isaac.
 Faith, according to Kierkegaard, is thus the biggest paradox. It requires 
a “leap” beyond reason and that which is specifically human. Therefore, 
it requires not just abandoning what is rational, known and widespread, 
but also that which – from a human perspective – is seen as ethical and 
objective. “What a tremendous paradox faith is”, says the author of Fear 
and Trembling, “a paradox which is capable of transforming a  murder 
into a holy act well-pleasing to God”, since faith is where it begins, where 
thinking is over. 36
Instead of a conclusion
Kierkegaard, by analyzing the biblical parable of Abraham, shows that 
between God’s order and human morality, there is a peculiar, insoluble 
conflict, that can find justification only in the paradoxical nature of faith 
34 A. Słowikowski, Dialektyka samotności według Kierkegaarda, [in:] Zrozumieć samotność, op. cit., 
p. 68-69.
35 J.L. Krakowiak, Absurd. Pytanie o sens ludzkiej egzystencji, Warszawa 2010, p. 213. Cf. L. Sze­
stow, Kierkegaard i filozofia egzystencjalna, p. 126-137.
36 S. Kierkegaard, Bojaźń i drżenie. Choroba na śmierć, p. 55.
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(credo quia absurdum). This faith, as we had the opportunity to see, de­
mands the suspension of teleological ethics, which involves giving up, and 
even abandoning, the socio-cultural norms of “the order of reason”. This 
means that there is a radical divide between the ethical and the religious 
stage of human existence that, simply put – there is no way to measure di­
vine orders with “human measures”: 
divine orders cannot be processed and evaluated from the perspective of 
human morality, just as they cannot be recognized by the human mind. 
These orders can therefore seem wicked, and the Author can pass for being 
bad, but this is only due to the scarcity of human perspective. 37
Faith, argues the philosopher, is, therefore, to reason, as an individual (sub­
jectivity) is to the general (universality). 38 This generality must, however, 
be transcended in order to, by becoming oneself, i.e., by reaffirming one’s 
independent existence, be found in “the absolute relation to the Absolute”.
The postmodern (radical) hermeneutics, focusing on the issue of God and 
religious experience (the experience of the impossible), which is particu­
larly worth emphasizing, refers to Kierkegaard’s diagnoses as well. 39 On 
the one hand, it is represented by the authors who affirmed this expe­
rience (Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Luc Marion, John D. Caputo), on the 
other, by ones focusing on the hermeneutics of what is possible (Gianni 
Vattimo, Richard Kearney). We are primarily interested in the first group 
of researchers. Lévinas, for example, criticizes the existing philosophical 
tradition of the West due to its “monologousness” and advocates its par­
adigm of “totality”, which requires philosophers to navigate around the 
area of  what is possible (rational, predictable and calculable). That “totali-
ty” is contrasted with Lévinas’ “infinity”, which directly seems to under­
stand what is impossible (religious). The adoption of the perspective of 
37 K. Pomian, Niewczesność i współczesność Kierkegaarda, [in:] Człowiek pośród rzeczy, Warszawa 
1973, p. 113.
38 Cf. S. Kierkegaard, Jednostka i  tłum, [in:] Filozofia egzystencjalna, ed. L. Kołakowski, K. Po­
mian, Warszawa 1965, p. 51-58.
39 Cf. M. Januszkiewicz, Kim jestem ja, kim jesteś ty? Etyka, tożsamość, rozumienie, Poznań 2012, 
p. 188-201. Januszkiewicz, analyzing the religious turn in postmodern hermeneutics, emphasi­
zes that “the post-secular era can reasonably be called the era of the death of the death of God” 
(p. 194), which does not mean a “naive” return to the era of the sacred. Marcin Jaranowski pays 
attention to relationships between postmodernism and religious thinking. Cf. M. Jaranowski, 
Transcendencja jako ocalenie. Søren Kierkegaard a problem teologii postmodernistycznej, Kraków 
2007. The philosophical turn to the post-secular era, as noted by John D. Caputo, (the position 
is also shared by Januszkiewicz cited above), was made by the nineteenth-century forerunners 
of existentialism – Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Cf. J.D. Caputo, On Religion, 
London and New York 2001, p. 49-56. 
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the “impossible”, we must add, means questioning “the order of reason”, 
which is, for the man of the West, an undisputed source of cognition. 40 
Marion, like Kierkegaard, argues, however, that God eludes scientific, ob­
jectified discussion, and any human categorizations and conceptualiza­
tions. God, writes the French philosopher, is God precisely because He 
extends beyond the intellectual human cognitive abilities, beyond what 
the human perspective sees as possible (predictable, probable). God be­
gins where the possible ends for us 41 and thus, where human reason can­
not reach, where it encounters aporias, contradictions and paradoxes. God 
experienced in the religious experience opens the impossibility horizon, 
which, for the individual, involves the affirmation of the “loss of land un­
der their feet”. Caputo, in turn, explicitly notes (following Kierkegaard) 
that the expe rience of the impossible is in fact a religious experience, de­
manding the suspension of the rational, ethical and socially valid. 42 
 Let us pause for a moment at the thought Caputo, whose proposal for 
radical hermeneutics adopts the goal of restoring “the primary difficulties 
of life”. 43 The author of Radical Hermeneutics, referring to the philosophy 
of Kierkegaard, deprives the human existence of the rational, metaphysi­
cal grounding, showing it in the face of the ineffable mystery (the impossi­
ble). He formulates at the same time the question of ethics anew, which – 
because of its difference from the traditional Judeo-Christian morality – is 
called post-metaphysical. The American philosopher is primarily inter­
ested in religious experience, which – as we have said – makes one able to 
overcome the ethical norms constituting “the order of reason”, placing the 
human being in the face of the impossible. On the sidelines, let us add that 
the religious perspective also opens for the individual due to deconstruc­
tion, which – according to Caputo – refers to the primordial experience of 
the impossible. 44 It allows at the same time – in the post-secular spirit – 
40 E. Lévinas, Całość i nieskończoność, Warszawa 1998.
41 J.L. Marion, The Impossible for Man –  God, [in] Transcendence and Beyond. A Postmodern Inqui-
ry, ed. J.D. Caputo, M.J. Scanlon, Bloomington and Indianapolis 2007, p. 25. 
42 Cf. J.D. Caputo, Against Ethics. Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference 
to Deconstruction, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1993, p. 3-5; Idem, On Religion, p. 109-117.
43 J.D.  Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis 1987, p. 1. For more about the radical hermeneutics of Caputo 
cf. Ł. Czajka, Święta anarchia. Wprowadzenie do radykalnej hermeneutyki Johna D. Caputo, Po­
znań 2014; N. Leśniewski, Projekt hermeneutyki radykalnej Johna D. Caputo, „Ruch Filozoficz­
ny”, 2-3/1996, p. 379-388; Idem, O hermeneutyce radykalnej, Poznań 1998, p. 117-163; M. Ja­
nuszkiewicz, W poszukiwaniu sensu. Phronesis i hermeneutyka, p. 231-259. More on the criticism 
of the project of radical hermeneutics by Caputo cf. e.g. A. Bielik-Robson, Inna nowoczesność. 
Pytania o współczesną formułę duchowości, Kraków 2000, p. 340. 
44 Cf. J.D. Caputo, M.J. Scanlon, Apology for the Impossible. Religion and Postmodernism, [in] God, 
the Gift, and Postmodernism, ed. J.D.  Caputo, M.J.  Scanlon, Bloomington and Indianapolis 
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overcoming the rationalist (secular, scientific, atheistic) worldview. Capu­
to, like Kierkegaard, opposes reducing religion to ethics, because religios­
ity – he emphasizes – is not limited to “official religion”, but often also 
takes various non-confessional, non-institutional forms. The author of On 
Religion speaks about “religion without religion”, concluding that religion 
can be “found” both in a historically set religious system (theology), and 
outside of it”. 45 The concept of “religion without religion”, explains the 
philosopher, does not mean a lack of ontological experience (absence, in­
sufficiency, scarcity), but an ecstatic “excess” of religious it, which – be­
cause of its diversity – escapes confessional religions. As Łukasz Czajka 
rightly comments: “without the deconstructive religion without religion, 
there is therefore not a lack of it, but rather an excess which cannot in itself 
accommodate denominational religions.” 46
 To demand the impossible, as noted already by Aristotle, is to  discover 
the weakness, the insufficiency of human reason; it is a desire to go beyond 
the obvious and predictable. 47 Undoubtedly, the biblical Abraham harbored 
just such a desire. Endowed with an “impotent force”, “ foolish wisdom” 
and “insane hope”, he waited for the arrival of the impossible. 48 So we can 
say not without reason that the affirmation of the impossible, as well as 
experience thereof, is primarily an existential-religious problem, demand­
ing the abandon of the specific intellectual tradition of the West (Western 
philosophical culture) of the rationalist worldview and “ scientific” vision 
of the world. Speaking the language of Kierkegaard: the “leap” beyond the 
earthly logical order, and also beyond what appears from a human per­
spective as ethical and social requires overcoming the aporia encountered 
by reason. The Bible itself teaches us about it, as it contains numerous 
examples confirming this thesis. Let us not forget the most representa­
tive ones: “For no word from God will ever fail” (Luke 1:37), “With man 
this is impossible, but not with God; all things are possible with God” 
(Mark 10:27), “The Lord does whatever pleases him, in the heavens and 
on the earth, in the seas and all their depths” (PS 135:6), “’What no eye 
has seen, what no ear has heard, and what no human mind has conceived’ 
1999, p. 3-4; J.D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. Religion without Religion, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis 1997, p. 1-3.
45 Cf. J.D. Caputo, On Religion, p. 3: “some people can be deeply and abidingly religious with or 
without theology, with or without the religions. Religion may be found with or without religion. 
That is my thesis.”
46 Ł. Czajka, op. cit., p. 84.
47 Cf. Arystoteles, Etyka nikomachejska, Warszawa 1956, p. 81: “for choice cannot relate to impo­
ssibles, and if anyone said he chose them he would be thought silly”.
48 Cf. J.D. Caputo, On Religion, p. 7-10. Cf. also Idem, Against Ethics, p. 1-19; Idem, The Prayers 
and Tears of Jacques Derrida, p. 188-212.
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the things God has prepared for those who love him” (1 Corinthians 2: 9), 
“I will destroy the wisdom of the wise; the intelligence of the intelligent 
I will frustrate” (1 Corinthians 1:19).
 It turns out that the affirmation of the impossible means the affirma­
tion of the “absolute relationship with the Absolute” that those may be 
capable of if they be ready for the “teleological suspension of ethics”, and 
so – in general – for challenging their existing, temporal existence. In oth­
er words, a religious person, rejecting common standard logic, “ready” for 
the coming of “the unexpected”, because the prospect of faith opens up the 
completely different horizon of understanding of reality and of themselves 
and their place in the world. It allows one to believe that the impossi-
ble (from the point of view of a human being) can, in fact, be possible (to 
God). Kierkegaard writes: 
for the understanding continued to be in the right in affirming that in the 
world of the finite where it holds sway this was and remained an impossi­
bility. This is quite as clear to the knight of faith, so the only thing that can 
save him is the absurd, and this he grasps by faith. So he recognizes the 
impossibility, and that very instant he believes the absurd; for, if without 
recognizing the impossibility with all the passion of his soul and with all 
his heart, he should wish to imagine that he has faith, he deceives himself, 
and his testimony has no bearing, since he has not even reached the infi­
nite resignation. 49
 While the human reason, coming to the end of its cognitive ability, 
stumbles on the aporias and limitations that situate the human being in 
front of the wall of the impossible, religiousness allows us to see a possibil­
ity in this impossibility orienting it towards what is non-conditioned, mys­
terious and unexpected. Coldly calculating –  operating inside the area of 
the possible – the instrumental reason is here contrasted with the religious 
attitude, exceeding any limits and faults: faith is the losing of one’s senses 
to find God. 50 “The impossible”, Kierkegaard would say, is possible only 
in the religious experience (experience of faith). The human being, turn­
ing towards God, exceeds its temporality (finite) nature in the direction of 
what is transcendent, indefinable, beyond the scientific, objective in hu­
man terms. To put it another way, “the impossible”, to which the  being 
turns in the act of faith, is inconceivable by the human mind and inex­
pressible in human conceptual categories precisely because it essentially is 
“beyond human measure”. The impossible” is therefore impossible from 
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the human point of view, the being existing within the limits of its fini­
tude; for God “the impossible” is possible sub specie aeternitatis.
 In the light of the observations made above, we can state that the im­
portance of Kierkegaard for post-secular thought, including radical her­
meneutics of Caputo, seems to be unquestionable. The author of Fear 
and Trembling was one of the first philosophers to venture for an in-depth 
reflection on the issue of religious experience (the experience of faith), 
which – transcending what is possible (ethical and aesthetic) – orients the 
individual toward that which is impossible.
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